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heirs of the grantor. The two rules seem to stand upon different
foundations.
The reason of the first rule seems to have been that the heir
claimed, through the ancestor, it is true, but from the lord, and that
title was unaffected by the power of alienation which the feudatory
acquired. If the feudatory aliened, that is, conveyed the estate to
a stranger, he defeated the title of the heir; if he did not alien,
then the heir took by virtue of the gift from the lord. The power
of alienation which the fundatory acquired, was not a power to
convey to himself, nor was it a power to convey to his heirs; but it
was a power to convey from himself and from his heirs. A limitation to himself or his heirs was, therefore, simply nugatory.
The other rule-the rule in Shelley's case-seems to have originated, and to have had its reason in the definition of an estate of
inheritance as conceived by the common law.1
In conclusion, we desire to enter a protest against an estate for
life -in real property, being called "a chattel in reference to property;" (p. 68,) or to any thing else. It is true that is a "Iusufruct," yet it was always so, and yet it was always a freehold, and
never a chattel. Let us not disturb landmarks with too nice a philosophy.
Mlontgomery, Ala., June 9th, 1853.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the United States Circuit Court, South Carolincj~trit,
.March Term, 1853.
BROOKS, BARDENy, ET A..; VS.

THE SHIP WILLIAM PENN, AND HER
OWNERS.

1. The Ship William Penn went ashore off Charleston harbour. The Steamer
Jasper, after remaining by the ship during a night of considerable peril, succeeded in dragging her over the shoal, and did not leave her until she was
anchored in deep water. Fifteen per cent. upon the value of the ship, togetlbr
with costs, allowed to the salvors.
2. Salvage services by steam-vessels encouraged-additional remuneration decreed.
The doctrine of the Raikes, 1 Hagg., p. 246, affirmed.
I See more fully, Keyes on Rem., 29, 37 et Seg.
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3.

The principles upon which the Admirality proceeds in awarding salvage, laid
down. The William Beckford, 3 C. Rob. 355 adopted.

4.

In apportioning salvage among the officers and crew of a steamer, the Court
regards their responsibilities in their different stations. Equal shares given to
the Master and Pilot.

Libel for Salvage.-Appeal from the District CourtYeadon

Macbeth, Proctors for Libellants.

.Petigru King, for Respondents.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
WAYNE, J.-I
concur with my learned brother, Judge Gilchrist,
in all the views expressed by him in this case, except in the
amount of salvage, which he has given to the libellants.
I think it altogether too small under the circumstances, especially so if they are considered in connexion with the kind of vessel which rendered the salvage service, and with the manner in
which it was done.
It was done by an uninsured steamboat, worth more than half the
value of the ship saved. Though in doing it, there was no imminent peril of life from the sea to the officers and crew of the steamer,
there was a risk of property from the sea, and both of property and
life from the manner in which the steamer was necessarily workeai
to effect the service, which make it a case for a larger remuneration than has been decreed, or than would be given if the ship
Williar
jp had been extricated from her dangerous condition,
by a wrecer, or sailing vessel, with the usual appliances in such
cases, of anchors, hawsers, capstan and windlass.
In the case of the Raikes, 1 Haggard's R. p. 246, which was the
first instance in England, of a salvage service rendered by a steam
packet, Lord Stowell reversed the award of Commissioners aptpoted by the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports to determine
diffences relating to salvage, and nearly doubled the amount of
the award, with all the expenses of the appeal, in favor of the
salvors. The Raikes in that case, was in a situation of actual ap-
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prehension, though not 6f actual danger, and she had been removed
from the sand upon which she had struck by a Deal Boat, but as
there was still an apprehension of danger, she was towed out of it
by a steam packet, into Ramsgate harbor.
In giving his judgment, Lord Stowell says, " I am inclined to give
as much encouragement as possible to similar exertions, on account
of the great skill, and the great power of vessels of this description."
I am not aware that the policy of his Lordships conclusion has
ever been questioned, but I am that it has been approved by his
successors, and that it has the concurrence of Admiralty lawyers
in our own country. It should be so; for a steamer can reach the
locality of a disaster sooner, and with more certainty than a sailing vessel can. When she arrives at it, she can take a nearer and
better position to give aid, can change it as often as exigencies
may require, can give readier assistance in saving life, and is more
efficient as to the power which can be applied, and as to the time
it may take to drag a vessel out of danger from a reef into deep
water, than it can be done in any other way. Besides, a steamer
used as a packet as the Jasper was, and occasionally only, for
towing vessels in safe and well known channels, can get insurance
for such employment. But it would have been difficult to get a
risk taken upon her as a wrecker at all, if not purposely adapted in
her enginery and other appointments for such an occupation. And
if, without being so, insurance were sought for a steam packet to
act in a particular case, as a wrecker, it is certain that the preequal
mium which would be asked would probably be fully 4V
to any compensation she could get for any salvage service she
might render. In this instance, the Presidents of two Insurance
Companies in Charleston, accustomed to calculate marine risks,
and well enough acqluainted with the reef upon which the William
Penn was run aground to form a safe judgment of her danger, and
the hazard to be run by a steam packet, in the attempt to getIf
declare that they would not have taken a risk at all for sucir a)k
advenrure, if any part of the duty was to be done in a night in
February: nor under any circumstances, for less than a premium
A
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of twenty to twenty-five per cent. -In such cases, then, the risk
must always be run by the owner of. the stedmer, as it, was, in this
by the owners of the Jasper.
Such considerations as have been stated, h_ brought me to the
conclusion that marine. assistance by steam oats must be encouraged by liberal compensation, -and that this, is a caae in which it
ought to be given.
The views which I have expressed ofthe superior claims of
steamers in such cases, are coincident with the principles by which
salvage is graduated. We do not alter, but extend them to cover
cases which now occur, but which could not have occured -before
steam was applied to navigation; in this way lessening the hazards
both of life and property to which navigation must ever be liable.
The facts upon which a Court exercises its discretion in giving
salvage, are the value of the property saved, the peril in which it
may have been, the risk of the property and persons exposed in
doing the service, and the timely interposition of both to, rescue
life and property from loss.
But the principles to which Courts are subordinate in graduating
salvage compensation, are founded in public policy, as that has been
disclosed by judicial precedents. They are full, and to the purpose.
Our own courts have said in several cases, that the service is of a
highly meritorious character. It consists in saving life and property abouto perish at sea, often at the peril of the salvor; the
interests of society require that the strongest inducements should
be held forth for its performance, and it is a settled principle that it
should be liberally rewarded.
The reward should be such as not only to afford an ample compensation to the salvor for the risk of life and property, and for
labor, privtions and hardships encountered, but so liberal as to
furnish a sufficient incentive to similar exertions by others.
Sir William Scott says, in the case of the William Beckford,* "the
principles on which a Court of Admiralty proceeds, lead to a liberal
remuneration in salvage cases; for they look not merely to the
.

*Robinson, 355.
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exact quantum of service performed in the case itself, but to the
general interests of the navigation and commerce of the country,
which are greatl
omoted by exertions of this nature. The fittigue,
the anxiety, the defjrmination to encounter danger, if necessaryspirit of adventure1he skill and dexterity which are acquired by
the exercise of that spirit, all must be taken into consideration.""
In order to apply those principles to the case in hand, I will
now show the condition of the William Penn from the time that
she took the bottom upon the breaker, until she was rescued from
it by the Jasper, and the risks that were run in performing that
service.
The breaker, upon which the ship was aground, is known as the
pumpkin hill of the north breaker. From the point where she
struck, as well as I can gather from the evidence, the breaker is
nearly north and south of the bar or entrance of the main ship
channel to Charleston. From the point mentioned, it is something
more or less than a statute mile to the southern termination of the
breaker; no where less than half a mile broad, having in its length
and width not more than from three to nine feet at low water, except
in two places, where it is ten feet on the east and west sides of the
breaker, both however shoaling towards the centre of the breaker
to three and seven feet water, and of course having no deeper
channel, over, from either side to the other. This description is
corroborated by the charts upon which the pilots rely.,thilst it is
dangerous in every part for a ship when run upon it, its position
and manifestation as a breaker, are so well defined at all times of
tide that it cannot be considered an obstacle or cause for apprehension in making an approach to the bar to get into the main ship
channel leading to the city.
The ship William Penn, of eight hundred and ten las burthen,
was cast ashore on this breaker: her captain says, it was not
caused by any stress of weather, but from an error in his reckoning. She was boarded by a pilot, Mr. Mullings, just before she
1 Cranch, 1; 3 Kent's Commentaries; Abbott on Shipping; Mason vs. The
Blaireau, 2 Cranch, 240; The Ewbank, 1 Sumner, 400; Tyson vs. Prior, 1 Gallison,
133; The Corn, 2 Washington, 280.
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gtruck, but not in time to prevent it by his attempt to wear ship.
Capt. )Fplger exonerates Mullings from all blanie. Re did.what
both of them thought 4post. likely to save the ohii from going
ashore, and the best that could be- done, iznles4she could have been
brought to anchor even at the hazard of cutting away her masts,
until there was a change of 'wind, or until she 'could .have: been
towed out of danger. lie that, however, as it 'may, thd ship was
heading W.N.W., the wind was N.E., or N.E. by E.; firesh, but
not a gale, ,and the pilot says she stopped hard and fast, in a few
minutes after he boarded her. ' Every effort was immediately made
to relieve the ship. Mullings sent the pilot boat to Charleston for a
dozen men to aid in lighting the ship. They came in the course
of the day, and threw some of her ballast out, and siarted her water,
hoping to get her off at high water; and at the next high water,
though somewhat lightened, she was as hard'and fast as when she first
struck at seven in the morning. 'lullings directed his messenger,
who went to town for aid,' to see Mr. Chapman, also a branch-pilot,
and to tell him to engage a steamer to come down to the Penn.
The stearii packet Gordon, "commanded by Captain Brooks, and
owned by himself and Captain Barden, did go down to the ship in
the afternoon, but not under any engagement with Capt. Chapman,
or with the agent of the owners of the ship. She carried with her
a new hawser,' succeeded in getting it to' the ship; but after repeated trials, running into three hours of the fighi, without starting the ship at all, Capt. Brooks relinquished the enterprise and
returned to the city. The wind was blowing fresh from the east.
The Gordon had to be in her place the next morning, in the city,
being in the service of the Government, and Capt. Brooks thought
it would have been dangerous to stay by the ship that night; and
her captainsays it would have been so. Besides, Capt. Brooks
did not leave the ship until the tide had been some time on the
ebb, which made it certain that no force could have hauled the
Penn from the .breaker until the high tide of the morning, if it
could then be done.
Capt. Brooks' attempt to aid the Penn with a steam packet more
than twice her cost, and at some risk, too, was meritorious; but as
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he did not put the ship at all out of her danger, or contribute to it
in any way -with the Gordon, the claim which he makes for salvage
on account of himself and his partner, Capt. Barden, and for the
crew of the Gordon; cannot be allowed. The Penn was all of that
night chafing and grating upon the sand, as she had been all the
day before, from seven o'clock in the morning. There was no
alteration of position for the better, or at all, except such as was
made by the force of the breakers, always greater upon a receding tide, and most so at low water. "The next morning," Capt.
Folger says, "1commenced with a strong breeze from the northward,
and eastward, with a very heavy sea. The sea was making a clean
breach over the ship, and caused her to thump badly. Towards
evening a hundred barrels of rum were started and stove in to
lighten the ship still more. After being pumped out, the ship was
put under all of her canvas at high water, with the yards braced
aback. She was started considerably to the southward and westward, and to the inner side of the shoal, but she hung forward as
the tide fell, and was hard and fast as ever. Her position had
been changed, but not into deeper water than that from and over
which she had been driven, or than that in the direction in which
it became necessary, from her change of position, to get her out of
the breakers."
In this state of things, Mullings ventures an opinion that the
ship might have been got off without the aid of a steam boat. I
cannot give any weight to that suggestion, for, besides finding him,
after the ship had been moved, sending for another steamer, witnesses, as competent from occupation and knowledge as he can be,
declare that by having been moved, she was put into a worse position than she had been before.
Capt. Relyea, of the steamer Charleston, altogether *disinterested witness, says the ship did change her position for the worse; for
there was more water to the northward than to the southward of
her.
Captain Chapman, who was on board of the Gordon the night
before, and who acted as pilot when the Jasper rescued the ship,
says he found that the ship had changed her position, and had
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got nearer to -where there was shoaler water to carry her through.
Her change of position was not for the better, but the.position
was'so chaiged that it was easier to drag her over to the westward, than to draw her back to the eastward.
William Reed, a, rigger and stevedore, who headed the gang
which was taken to the Penn, to aid in lighting her, and who has
followed the sea for sixteen years, is inclined to Mullings' opinion
from two soundings which he made after the ship-had been moved
to where she took the ground the second time. :But,.whilst, he no
doubt did his duty well in his proper place, he Admits that 'The is
only somewhat acquainted with the bar," and therefore has not
such knowledge as can give any aid to Mullings' opinion or to
lessen that of Captains Chapman and Relyea, both of whom say
that the ship, by having been forced from where. she struck to
where she was carried by the mbrning's maceuvre, had been put in
a worse position.

I must conclude from the evidence that the Penn was in great
peril from the time she struck until she was -taken off the breakers
by the Jasper. In less than two hours after she was taken into
deep water, she had from three to four feet water in her, hold.
When examined, it was ascertained that her 'fore and main top
masts were badly sprung, that the rigging of the fore-mast was
much injured, that she had slued her forefoot, and was considerably damaged also about the stern. The repair of her injuries cost
more than eight thousand dollars.
It is scarcely necessary, after such a statement, to give in detail
the evidence of the ship's peril, from the time that she took the
bottom for more than thirty-six hours, until the Jasper took her
out of it; but it will be as well to do so.
Her Ca in says the ship's situation was dangerous, and that
she stood in great need of relief; qualifying it only by saying that
no one can say she must have perished without the aid of the Jasper. He, of course, speaks of the time when the Jasper came to
her relief. The *whole narration of Mullings shows that he thought
so, and that she stood in need of immediate assistance from a steamer. He has graduated too, the compensation of three hundred
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dollars, received by him for his services, upon, his apprehension
,that they were rendered to a ship in imminent danger. Mr. Vincent says she was in, great peril-breakers all around.her. Capt.
Relyea testifies that the Penn, was a shore on the Eastern side of
Pumpkin Hill Breaker.. She was in as Pad a place as. a ship could
be to be saved. Captain Chapman, adds, the William Penn was
most certainly in .a ,dangerous position. Mr. Paine, speaking of
where she was first struck, says the Penn was in a; very dangerous
position, lying right broadside to the sea.
Capt. McDonald, a branch pilot, saw the ship on the breakerwas not near enough to see her exact position, being almost five miles
off-but from his knowledge of the shoals, saw she was in a dangerous position. He was surprised that she was saved; thinks she
could not have been saved without extraordinary exertion; very
doubtful if she could have been without the assistance of a steamer,
but it may have been possible. Mr. Lea, another branch pilot, considered the William Penn in a very dangerous position, so much so
that he would not have gone on board of her that night to save the
ship, for it was a very dirty looking night, and a very heavy sea.
All of these witnesses make any comment on the testimony of
Captain Nichols unnecessary.
I will now show the manner in which the Jasper performed her
services, and the risk which she ran in doing it. It is done, not
only with a view of showing the dangers encountered by her from
the sea and from the sieam which it was necessary to put upon her
engine, but because it is as good an illustration as can be given of
the superiority of steamers in such cases, from the nearer approach
which can be made by them to the point of danger, and their
power to keep the position it may be necessary for them to take,
against adverse winds and currents, in the midst of 1 breakers.
Mr. Lafitte, the Agent of the owners of the Gordon and Jasper,
having ascertained the unsuccessful result of the attempt made
with the Gordon, determined to send the Jasper to her assistance.
She was furnished with a strong force, and supplied with provisions and fuel "for two or three days," with orders to stay by the
ship as long as there was any hope of saving her, or any thing
from her, in case of her being wrecked. The Jasper was taken
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down at a proper time before high water. It gave her captain and
pilot an opportunity to reconnoitre the ground, and the ship's position upon it, and to make such preparations as they might suggest
for the work which she had to do.
Mullings and Capt. Nichols think that the Jasper was not at any
time in danger from the breakers. But Mullings' opinion in this
as in that, when he said the ship might have been relieved without
the 'aid of a steamer after she had been carried from the outer to
the inner side of the shoal, was obviously formed upon the soundings of Davenport, which are no foundation for either conclusion,
as he does not say at what time of tide they were made, though
they were made on the ebb tide, from the beginning of which until
low water the depth changes at least five and a half feet, which
brings his soundings within that fluctuation, without in any way
establishing the fact that the ship had gained a point from which
there was a clearer way into deep water from the breakers. Indeed, that Davenport did not think so, is plain, for it was after his
soundings had been made, that he proposed to Capt. Folger, to take
the chronometers to the pilot boat, because "they would get jarred
in the ship," and as he innocently thought, salvage would be saved
upon them, if the ship was saved.
We must look to other witnesses for the real danger encountered
by the Jasper, while she was dragging the ship out of the breakers,
which were on every side of her.
These witnesses relied upon, are Captains Hayden and Chapman, William Bedford, the engineer of the Jasper, William P. Lea,
a branch pilot, Captain Relyca, of the steamer Charleston, and
Mr. Vincent, who was also present. The three first are interested
witnesses as salvors. The other three are not so, but they confirm
the testimony of the first in their facts and conclusions. It is not
a case, therefore, for those allowances which must be made for the
testimony of interested witnesses, or for the exercise of that caution
with which Courts receive and scan it.
Hayden says lie ran the Jasper for the ship, until she was in
seven feet water, her draft being five and a half. It waq a stormy
looking night, heavy sea, and dark overhead. He had been a marl38
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ner for thirty-three years. He considered the Jasper in great risk,
more so, than he will ever run again to save property. He is acquainted with the shoals. The Jasper's stern was in the breakers.
The sea broke and washed through her after gangways, stove in
one of the dead lights, and though the pumps were going all the
time to keep the water under, she had a foot and a half water in
her when they reached town. Did not leave the ship until she was
safely anchored in deep water; she was dragged over the shoal.
Chapman says, the night was dark, the sea was heavy, a good
deal of wind, and the sea breaking against the steamboat's stern.
If he had owned the boat, from the danger which he saw from the
leakage of the steam-pipe, and the gush of water through the dead
lights, he would have let go, and not continued that night to try to
save the ship.
Bedford, the engineer of the Jasper, "went down to the William
Penn with the usual press of steam. When they put their lines out,
put on the usual press of steam for towage, 20 inches; finding from
the roughness of the sea and the weight of the ship, that 20 inches
could not bring the engine round, he raised the steam to 28 inches;
not being able to get the ship off with that force, was ordered by the
Captain to put it up to 85 inches. The boat was then doing her
best. He pushed the boiler as much as he dared do with safety."
Lea saw the Jasper at work trying to save the ship; thought her
in great danger from the heavy sea and the breakers. Vincent,
another disinterested witness, also present, declares that the Jasper
was in great danger, that she was in the heaviest breakers.
Captain Relyea, of the Charleston, considered the Jasper in great
risk, so much so that he would not risk his boat any longer after
dark. If the Jasper had not been there, he might have stayed; he
would not have stayed to save property. He would not have stayed
there that night to save the ship, if there were no lives on board:
he would not have deemed it prudent to do so. He said, at the
time, as the Jasper was there to save life, he would not remain.
The weather was dark, threatened to be worse; it was dark and
stormy, spitting rain. Has been much at sea as a mariner; is
well acquainted with the coast from Savannah to New York.
He has saved many vessels with steamboats. The steamer Jasper
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was in a very perilous position between two breakers, right and left,
when she had hold of the ship. When he left, had no idea that the
Jasper could have done more than save the lives of the ship's company; thought she would have gone to pieces. Witness got by an
award of the Chamber of Commerce, forty per cent. salvage, for
saving the Alliance and cargo. Don't think his risk in saving the
ship Alliance was so great as in saving the -Penn, for when the Alliance was saved he had pretty good summer weather. The Jasper
is about the same power as the Charleston, and the Charleston is
thought a powerful boat for such purposes.
My object in citing the evidence so particularly, is to show that
the risk run by the Jasper in rescuing the Penn, makes it a case
within the principle that encouragement must be given to steam
boats for effective salvage-service to vessels in distress and in dan- ger of perishing.
It is admitted, notwithstanding the damages which the William
Penn had sustained, that she was worth when placed off the break- _
ers into deep water, twenty-three thousand dollars.
I might consistently with adjudicated cases, give a larger remuneration than fifteen per cent. upon that sum, but after the best
consideration of the case, and of those principles of public policy
which are applicable to it, I shall pronounce a decree for fifteen
per cent. in favor of the salvor, with the costs of appeal, and such
as can rightly be taxed for the proceedings in this suit in the District Court.
In the distribution of the salvage, I have tried to carry out the
principle of encouragement by giving to the captain and the engineers of the Jasper, and to the crew, and to the pilot, portions as
near as I could ascertain it, founded upon their responsibilities in
their different stations. The amounts will appear in'the decree. I
think it right, also, to state that the evidence relating to the offers of
of compromise from the owners of the ship, have not had any influence upon my judgment. My conclusion shows, that I think they
were insufficient, and that the salvors were right in seeking a reward
in a Court of Admiralty.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed.

59Q.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court of Maine, Cumberland County, May, 1853.
In Equity.
THE INHABITANTS OF YARMOUTH vs. THE TRUSTEES OF THE SCHOOL
FUNDS IN NORTH YARMOUTH, ET ALS.
1. The distinction between public and private corporations, has reference to their
powers, and the purposes of their creation. They are public when created for
public purposes only, connected with the administration of the government, and
when the interests and franchises are the exclusive pr4erty and domain of the
government All other corporations are private.
2. Over public corporations, the Legislature has power not limited by the Constitution, to impose such modifications and restraints as the general interests may require, without infringing private rights.
3. Grants and charters of private corporations, when accepted, assume the
character and elements of contracts, from which rights and franchises may flow,
but over which, without the consent of the corporation, the Legislature has no
more control than over private rights of property, unless on the default of the
corporation judicially established.
4. When incorporated, the trustees of funds for the use of schools in a town, constitute a private corporation; and that portion of an Act of the Legislature providing for the division of the same town, and an incorporation of a part of the
territory into a separate town, which requires the trustees to divide the fund,
(and pay over a portion of it to other trustees, who were to receive and appropriate it to the use of schools in the, town then incorporated,) is in violation of
private rights, and in conflict with the provision of the Constitution, which prohibits the Legislature from any law impairing the obligation of contracts, and is
inoperative and void.'

J.-The parties expressed a desire, at the argument,
that this case might be heard and determined, as if free from
technical difficulties. Yielding to their request, we pass the demurrers, to examine the general merits upon the bill and answei's.
The leading facts are not in controversy.
It seems that the town of North Yarmouth claimed a tract of
land called the "School Farm," consisting of about two hundred
acres, originally appropriated for the use of schools in that town.
Whether this was a grant from the proprietors, or from the government, does not appear. By a special Act of the Legislature of
Massachusetts, of March 8, 1806, certain inhabitants of that town
were incorporated as "The Trustees of School Funds in the town
HOWARD,

' See to the same point, Plymouth vs. Jackson, 15 Penn. St. 1I. 44.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

597

of North Yarmouth ;" they and their successors to be and continue
a body politic and corporate, by that name, forever; and to have a
common seal, with power to sue and to be sued, by that name. The
act provided further, that the number of trustees should not be
more than eleven, nor less than seven, and that they should fill all
vacancies occurring in the Board, by death, resignation or other-'
wise, from the inhabitants of that town, and have power to remove
any of their number who might become unfit from any cause, for
discharging their duties as trustees. They were authorized and
empowered, by the same act, to sell the ".School Farm so called,
consisting of two hundred acres, more or less, belonging to said
town of North Yarmouth, which was originally appropriated for
the use of schools, and to put out at interest the money arising
from such sale, in manner hereinafter mentioned, and for that purpose, they were to " sell and convey in fee simple," and place
the proceeds on interest, and to invest the interest with the principal, until the annual income should be $300, and then to apply
that sum " towards the annual support of public schools in said
town, to be appropriated among the several school districts in said
town, in proportion to what they pay of town taxes. And it shall
never be in the power of said town or trustees, to alter*or alienate
the appropriation of the fund."
The trustees accepted the trust, conveyed the land, received the
proceeds, and have had the exclusive possession and management
of the funds. Whether the town assented, does not directly appear,
but it may fairly be presumed, from their long acquiescence, and
receiving the income under the provisions of the act without objection, that they assented to its passage. Lanesorouglhv. Curtis,
22 Pick. 320. The Act of 1821, providing for the incorporation
of Cumberland, from a portion of North Yarmouth, and for a
division of the school funds; and the Act of 1829, authorizing the
trustees to appropriate the income of the funds, before the annual
amount was $300, do not affect the principles of this decision.
We assume, then, that the trustees of the school funds in North
Yarmouth, were legally incorporated, and that they have performed
their duties according to the terms of their charter, in raising,

598

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

investing, managing, and in exclusively possessing and controlling
the funds, in pursuance of the objects for which they were incorporated, until the passage of the act of incorporation of Yarmouth,
(August 8i 1849, c. 264). This is admitted or assumed at the
argument.. Indeed, the complainants proceed upon this assumption.
The plaintiffs claim a portion of these school funds, according to
the provisions of the 4th section of their act of incorporation.
The defendants resist the claim,--upon the ground that the funds
were not within the control or direction of the legislature, and that
the fourth section, which provides for the division of the funds, is
unconstitutional and void. It is not pretended that either North
Yarmouth or the trustees, assented to the provisions of that section,
but they seem to have resisted them throughout. Were they binding upon the trustees, and could the legislature authoritatively
require them to divide the funds thus intrusted, and deliver them
to others ? This brings us to the consideration whether the trustees were constituted a public or a private corporation.
The distinction between public and private corporations has
reference to their powers, and the purposes of their creation.
They are public, when created for public purposes only, connected
with the administration of the government, and where the "1whole
interests and franchises are the exclusive property and domain of
the government itself." Over these, the legislature has power, not
limited by the Constitution, to impose such modifications, extensions, or restraints as the general interests and public exigencies
may require, without infringing private rights. All corporations,
invested with subordinate powers, for public purposes, fall within
this class, and are subject to legislative control. All other corporations are private. ' They exist by legislative grants, conferring
powers, rights and privileges, for special purposes. These grants
are essentially contracts, which the legislature cannot impair or
change, without the consent of the corporation. Coke Lit. § 413;
Yin. Abr. Corp. A. 2 ; Phillipsv. Bury, 2 T. R. 346 ; Dartmouth,
College v. Toodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Allen v. KeKeen, 1 Sumner, 276; The People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325; Penobscot
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Boom Corp. v. Lamson, 16 Maine' 224;' Story Coom. on Const.
§1385-1388 ; Angel & Ames on Corp: 9,27, 28.
The fee of the "School Farm", was in the town of North Yarmouth, in trust for the use of schools, in. 1806, when the Legislature
of 'Massachusetts, by consent of those interested, as we must presume from their entire acquiescence, authorized the sale of the
land, and the creation of a personal fund from the proceeds, by the
trustees then incorporated, in trust for the same use. This fund
was never in the town, but was vested, by the act, in the trustees,
as a corporation, for the use mentioned, forever., They did not
constitute a muhicipal or public corporation, although the object of
its creation might have been a public benefit. Their charter was a
grant from the State, partaking of the nature of a contract, which
they accepted, and in which the government had no interest: This
was a franchise which involved the right to possess and control
property, and the right to perpetuate a corporate immortality. 2
Blackstone Comm. 37. Though springing from the grant, the
franchise, and the rights flowing from it were no more subject to
the control or interference of the legislature, than were private
rights of property, unless on default of the corporation, judicially
determined. 2 Kent. Comm. 306. Trustees of the new Gloucester School Fund v. Bradbury, 11 Maine, 118, is a case similar to
this at bar, and directly in point. Bichardsonv. Brow6n, 6 Maine,
355; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch. 43; Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch,
292.
The act relating to the separation of this State from Massachusetts, provides that " all grants of lands, franchises, immunities,
corporate or other rights, &c., shall continue in full force," after
Maine shall become a separate State. The first section .of that
act, embracing the provisions referred to, forms a part of our Constitution, Art. 10, § 5, condition 7; Acts of Massachusetts, June
19, 1819. The statute of this State, of February 19, 1831, c.
492, § 1, to which the Legislature of Massachusetts gave its consent, so far altered the terms and conditions of the act relating to
the separation of the States, "that the trustees of any ministerial
or school fund, incorporated by the Legislature of Massachusetts,
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in any town within-this State, shall have, hold and enjoy their
powers and privileges, subject to be altered, restrained, extended
or annulled, by. the Legislature of Maine, with the consent of such
trustees, and of the town. for whose benefit suck fund was establisled." In this, case, there was no consent.
It. follows, that the "trustees of the school funds in North
Yarmouth," constituted a private corporation; that they can hold
and enjoy their rights -nd privileges under their charter, independent of legislative interference or cdntrol, except for causes which
do not now appear; and. that so much of the 4th section of the
act to incorporate the town of Yarmouth, as provides for the
division of "the school funds belonging to the town of North
Yarmouth," is inoperative and void. The Constitution is imperative, that the legislature shallpass no law impairingthe obligation
of contracts. Const. of Maine, Art. 1, § 11; Const. U. S., Art.
1, § 10, clause 1.
This result renders further consideration of the merits, or of the
objectiqns, unimportant. The bill must be dismissed, with costs
for defendants.

In New York Supreme Court, Monroe Special Term.
FREDERICK EOLLET VS. ELAM R. JEWETT AND THOMAS 3. FOOTE.
1. The incongruous rule 6f the Courts of New York and other States, that a defendnt in an action for slander or libel, might show, to rebut the presumption of
malice, that he believed the charge when made to be true, but must not show anything tending to prove it true, traced to its origin in the case of Underwood vs.
Parks, 2 Strange 1200.
2. .The rule in Underwood vs. Parks, is shown not to be an original rule of the common law, but a departure therefrom, and a mere piece of judicial legislation. The
defect in this legislation in excluding appropriate matter in mitigation, because
not yleaded, without providing any mode in which it could be pleaded, exhibited.
Also shown, how the matter was made still worse by the gratuitous adoption of
another rule, viz: that pleading the truth of the charge in justification, was conclusive evidence of malice in the original publication.
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3. Section 165 of the New York Code of Procedure, properly construed, affords a
complete remedy for the evils resulting from these unjust rules.
4. The construction given to this Section, in Graham vs. Stone, 6 How. Pr. R. 15,
disapproved; and shown to leave the matter in a worse condition than before.'
5. The subject of giving evidence in actions of slander of previous rcortsof the truth'
of the charge in mitigation, considered; and the distinction between such evidence
as bearing upon the character of the plaintiff, and upon the presumption of
malice on the part of the defendant, adverted to. Evidence of this kind being
admitted in England for the latter purpose, but not in the State of New York.
6. The difference in actions for libel, between cases where the libellous article is
merely a republication of an article previously published, and where it re-asserts
the charge, referring to the previous article as authority, exhibited.
7. In the former case, the prior publication maybe given in evidence in mitigationin the latter. Quere.
8. The rule in relation to striking out redundant matter under the code is, that unless
it is clear that no evidence can properly be received under the allegations objected
to, they will he retained until the trial.
9. When therefore the alleged libel contained the following: "The indictmentbrought
against him, (the plaintiff) by his own friends, has never been answered or disproved. He stands accused of a heedless and extravagant, if not corrupt squandering of the canal funds under his control: and this we presume the Courier
regards as one proof of the ' friendliness' of Mr. Follet for the canal;" and the
answer set up in mitigation, that the State Auditor had made a report to the
Canal Board, charging the plaintiff substantially, as charged in the libellous
article, which report had been published in the newspapers of the State with
comments: and that the article complained of was based upon such reports and
comments, and was a legitimate commentary thereon; a motion to strike out the
matter so pleaded in mitigation, as redundant, was refused.

This was an action for a libel. The plaintiff, at the time of
the publication of the alleged libel, was one of the Canal Commissioners of the State of New York, and then a candidate before the people for re-election.
The defendants were publishers of a daily newspaper, in the City
of Buffalo, called the Buffalo Commercial Advertiser.
The obnoxious article consisted of an elaborate editorial comment, upon a paragraph taken from the Buffalo Courier-a paper
friendly to the plaintiff, and contained, among other things, the
following :
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"The indictmeit brought against him (the plaintiff) by his own
friends, has never been answered or disproved. He stands accused
of a heedless and extravagant, if not corrupt squandering of the
canal funds under his control, and this we presume the Courier
regards as one proof of the ' friendship' of Mr. Follet for the
canal."
*The answer set up in substance a series of official acts on the
part of the plaintiff, as a justification in full of all the charges
contained in the article alleged to be libellous, and then appends
the following paragraph, viz: "And the defendants further answering, say, a8 mitigating eircumstances,according to the statute,

that before the publication of the said supposed libel, G. W. Newell,
Esq., auditor, etc., made on the 25th day of August, 1852, a report
to the Canal Board and the Commissioners of the Canal Fund, in
and by which it appeared, among other things, that the expenditures for repairs and superintendence, on the division of the canal
under charge of said plaintiff, had for the six months previous
thereto increased to the amount of fifty per cent. over those of any
like period of time in any former year: that said report was published in the various newspapers in this State, accompanied by
editorial comments, charging the said plaintiff with incompetency
and corruption, and wasteful and extravagant expenditures of the
public funds; and that the said supposed libel referred to and
was based upon the facts' contained in the said report, and such
editorial comments as aforesaid, and was a legitimate commentary
thereon."
The answer then set -out the same official acts of the plaintiff,
not as a defence but in mitigation of the damages, and in conclusion repeats the paragraph just recited. The defendants moved to
strike this paragraphl relating' to the report of the Auditor, from
the answers in both places where it occurs, as irrelevant and
redundant.
W. G. Bryan, for Plaintiff.
ff. W. Rogers, for Defendant.
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S.ELDEDN, J.-This motion brings under review, the law in relation to mitigating damages in actions for oral and written slanders-a subject which has brought great and just reproach upon
the common law.
The Courts have struggled with the incongruous rules which
have prevailed upon this subject for more than a century, without
ever having in a single instance taken the trouble to trace the difficulty to its source.
Those rules have been frequently denounced as absurd. I will
refer to one instance only-in the case of Dolloway vs. Turrill,26
Wend. 383. Senator Lee, (page 390) says-I"I cannot avoid the
conclusion from cases coming under my own observation as well as
those appearing in the books, that the tendency of the decisions is
to hedge around and protect plaintiffs in actions of slander generally, as if they were the particular favorites of the Courts; and to
embarrass defendants with difficulties, as if it were desirable to prevent their giving the truth in evidence in justification."
A few passages from our own State Reports, will amply justify
these remarks. In Root vs. King, 7 Cow, 613, Chief Justice
Savage says, that the defendant, in an action for libel or slander" May show in evidence, under the general issue by way of excuse,
any thing short of a justification which does not necessarily imply
the truth of the charge, or tend to prove it true, but which repels
the presumption of malice arising from the fact of publication,"(page 633).
Justice Marcy, in Wormouth vs. Cramer, 3 Wend. 395, says"Particular facts, which might form links in the chain of circumstantial evidence against the plaintiff, cannot be received under the
general issue in mitigation of damages."
In Purple vs. Horton, 13 Wend. 9, Judge Savage again lays
down the rule as follows :-" Facts and circumstances might be
shown in mitigation, when they disprove malice and do not tend to
prove the charge, or form a link in the chain of evidence to prove
a justification."
In Cooper vs. Barber, 26 Wend. 105, Judge Bronson holds the
same doctrine. He says-" Facts and circumstances which tend
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to disprove malice by showing that the defendant, through mistake,
believed the charge true, when it was made, may be given in evidence in mitigation of damages. But, if the facts and circumstances offered tend to establish the truth 6f the charge, or form a
link in the chain of evidence going to make out a justification, they
are not admissible in mitigation of damages."
To me it seems that nothing could be more inconsistent than this
rule. Its separate branches are directly repugnant to each other
The words "facts and circumstances," as used in these extracts, do
not include rumors or reports of the truth of the charge, or mere
information to that effect, derived from other credible persons:
these belong to another branch of the subject.
How, then, can we conceive of any facts and circumstances, which
when proved would show that the defendant believed the charge
when made to be true, and which would at the same time have no
tendency to prove it true ? There are no such facts and circumstances in any case. How could the defendant persuade the jury
that he believed the charge, without showing some reason for that
belief? The rule nullifies itself, and virtually prohibits the defendant from giving any evidence to repel the presumption of malice.
On the other hand, the plaintiff is at full liberty to give evidence
of express malice, with a view to enhance the damages. This has
been repeatedly held. Defries vs. -Davis, 7 Car. & Payne, 112;
Bromage vs. Prosser,4 Barn. & Ores. 247; toward vs. Sexton, 4
Comst. 157.
First then, malice is presumed from the falsity of the charge;
to this the plaintiff' may superadd proof of positive malice, and
thus aggravate the damages, while the defendant is precluded from
giving any evidence to rebut malice in mitigation. He is told that
he may give evidence to show'that he believed the charge to be
true, provided it have no tendency to prove it true: that is, he may
if he can, show that he believed it true, but must not show that he
had the slightest reason to believe it. This is mockery.
There is not the least difficulty in tracing this absurdity to its
origin, and showing precisqly how it crept into our judicial system.
Originally, not only any thing that had a legitimate tendency to
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disprove malice, but even the truth of the charge itself might be
given in evidence under the general issue, in an action of slander
to mitigate the damages.
The case of Smithies vs. Harrison,1 Lord Ray, 727, shows that
such was the law at that early period, and this practice was in
harmony with the general principles applicable to other cases. It
never was any objection to evidence in mitigation, that under a
different state of the pleadings it might constitute a complete
defence.
But it seems that the practice was found liable to the objection,
that plaintiffs were frequently surprised by proof, as to the truth of
the charge which they had made no preparation to meet.
Wheil, therefore, in the later case of Underwood vs. -Parks,2
Strange, 1200, which was an action of slander, the defendant
offered, under the plea of not guilty, to prove the words to be true,
in mitigation of damages, the Chief Justice refused to permit it,
saying, that "1at a meeting of all the judges upon a case that arose
in the Common Pleas, a large majority,of them had determined not
to allow it for thefuture : but that it should be pleaded, whereby
the plaintiff might be prepared to defend himself, as well as to
prove the speaking of the words."
It is this little item of judicial legislation, which has created all
the trouble. The embarrassment consequent upon it, has been felt
from that day to the present. The -object of the rule was just and
right, but its effects, when operating in connection with other established rules, was not foreseen.
If after this, a defendant in an action of slander offered to mitigate the damages, by proving under the general issue, not that the
words were true, but that he had when they were spoken, good
reason to believe them to be true, he was met by the objection that
this would violate the rule in Underwood vs. Parks.
This objection was sound. A rule which excluded evidence of
the truth of the words, if carried out, must, necessarily exclude
evidence tending to prove them true. It would obviously be impossible to anticipate the effect of the evidence, and to discriminate
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in advance, between such as might produce conviction in the minds
of the jury, and that which would fall short of it.
Here, then, a dilemma was at once presented. The established
rules of pleading would allow nothing short of a justification to be
spread upon the record. The defendant, therefore, was prevented
by this rule from pleading the absence of malice in mitigation, and
by the rule in Underwood vs. Parks, from giving it in evidence
without being pleaded.
The whole difficulty would have been obviated, if the judges,
when they undertook to change a rule of the common law had foreseen, that unless they went a little farther in their legislation, and
provided that defendants might plead or give notice of matter in
mitigation, their rule would effectually exclude all such evidence.
In England, the Courts in some instances paying more regard
to justice than to logic, held, that although a defendant could not
give in evidence in mitigation, matter, which if pleaded would
amount to a justification, he might nevertheless prove any thing
falling short of it. Knobell vs. puller, Norris' Peake, Append.
pend. 32; Leicester vs. Walter, 2 Camp. 251.
But it was manifest that this rule, and that in Underwood vs.
Parks, could not stand together; and the legal profession then
resorted to another expedient for avoiding the effect of the latter
rule, which was, to put in a plea of justification in all cases, under
which they introduced their evidence with a view of having it considered in mitigation.
In many of the States the Courts have followed the ruling in
Knobell vs. Puller and Leicester -vs. Walton, supra; but in this
State and in the State of Massachusetts, the Judges, with a logic
which cannot be impugned, whatever we may think of the justice of
its application, insisted, th a rule which excluded evidence of the
truth of the words, must exclude evidence having a tendency to
establish its truth.
This conclusion would have produced very little practical inconvenience, if they had left open the mode resorted to in England of
avoiding its effect by receiving evidence going to disprove malice
under a plea of justification, or rather, by considering such evidence
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in mitigation, when thus given. 1But here arose, first in Massachusetts, and then in this State, another obstacle in the way of a
defendant who was prepared to prove his innocence of all malicious
intent.
It was held, that putting a plea of justification upon the record
was in itself conclusive evidence of malice, and precluded the
defendant from setting up a want of malice, or claiming any mitigation on account of its absence.
In the case of Boot vs. King, 7 Cow. 613, Ch. J. Savage says:
"When a defendant undertakes to justify because the publication
is true, the plea, or which is the same thing, a notice of justification, is a republication of the libel. It is an admissionof the malicious intent with which the publication was first made."
In the same case in error, 4 Wend. 114, Chancellor Walworth,
(page 139,) says: "If the charge is true the defendant has another
remedy by pleading tlt truth in bar of the action, which will be a
complete defence; but if he sets up such defence which turns out
to be untrue, it is a deliberate repetition of the slander on the
records of the Court, and it is then too late for him to allege that
the charge was made under a mistake."
Again, in Purple vs. Horton, 13 Wend. 9, Ch.J.Savage repeats
the doctrine. He says: "Notice of justification put upon the record is evidence conclusive of malice. If a notice that a defendant
intends to prove the truth is evidence of malice, the offer of evidence tending towards proof cannot show the absence of malice."
Thus were defendants hedged about on every side, and mitigation of damages by disproving malice was rendered impossible. . If
they declined to justify upon the record, their evidence could not
be received, because it would violate the rule of Underwood vs.
Parks,supra; and if they did so, and failed to make a complete
justification, however near they might come to it, they, according
to this doctrine of the Courts, only aggravated their guilt.
This was the state of the law in this State at the time of the
enactment of the code.
. In Massachusetts, where the same rules were adopted, the Legislature interposed long since. See Stat. of 1826, ch. 107, sec. 2,
.V

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

which, after providing that a plea of justification shall not be taken
as evidence that the words were spoken, proceeds as follows: "nor
shall such plea of justification, if the defendant fail to establish it,
be of itself proof of the malice of such words; but the jury shall
decide upon the whole case, whether such plea was or was not made
with malicious intent."'
This statute furnished a complete remedy for the difficulty which
grew out of the doctrine that a plea of justification was an admission of malice; but it left the rule of Underwood vs. Parks in full
force, without the obvious relief which a simple provision that a
defendant might plead or give notice of matter in mitigation, would
have afforded.
This brings me to the remedy which the code has provided. Sec.
165 reads as follows: "In the actions mentioned in the last section, (libel and slander,) the defendant may, in his answer, allege
both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory, and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages; and whether
he prove the justification or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating circumstances."
How was it possible to devise a provision more exactly adapted
to meet and remove the embarrassments which we have seen
existed? The omission in the rule of Underwood vs. Parks is supplied, and the doctrine, obviously unsound in regard to the effect of
a plea of justification, abrogated.
In the case of Graham vs. Stone, 6 How. Pr. R., 15, Justice
Johnson was called upon at special term to give a construction to
this section. In the-general tone and spirit of his decision in that
case I cordially concur : but I am unable to assent to either of the
positions, 1st, that mitigating circumstances must necessarily be
plded in connection with a justification, or 2d, that the section
was not intended to admit any evidence in mitigation which was not
admissible before. If this construction is sustained, one of the most
highly remedial provisions which the code contains, is rendered
nugatory.
The answer before us was obviously drawn to meet the doctrine
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of this case, and hence the incorporation of the mitigating matter
sought to be expunged with the matter set up as a justification.
But I cannot concur in the construction given in Gralham vs.
Stone, for another reason. If the complaint is verified, the defendant could only plead in mitigation in cases where, at the time of
putting in his answer, he could conscientiously swear to his belief
of the truth of the charge. This would leave the subject in a
worse condition even than before the code, when defendants could
plead a justification, and thus introduce their mitigating evidence,
which the jury in most cases would not fail to consider, notwithstanding the charge of the judge to the contrary.
There is nothing in the language of sec. 165 which imperatively
calls for the interpretation given to it in Graltam vs. Stone. I
feel constrained, therefore, to hold that matter in mitigation may
be pleaded either with or without a justification; butif with a justification, it should be pleaded separate from, and not as a part of it.
The consequence of this conclusion is, that the paragraph objected
to where it occurs as a part of the defence set up by way of justification, is redundant, and must be stricken out.
The other paragraph is well pleaded, provided the matter alleged
is such as can properly be received in mitigation of damages.
This brings us to another question about which much confusion
has prevailed.
In actions of slander the attempt has often been made to mitigate
the damages by proving that the defendant did not originate the
charge, but that reports of its truth were current before; and in
actions for libel, that the charge had been taken from some previous publication.
Much embarrassment has arisen from the want of proper discrimination as to the object of this evidence. Reports unfavorable
to a plaintiff may be offered for either of two purposes: To prove
the character of the plaintiff to be bad, or to repel the presumption
of malice. It is evident that these two modes of diminishing the
damages are entirely distinct in their nature, and yet the cases in
regard to this kind of proof treat them indiscriminately; and hence
the confusion on the subject.
39

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

The English Courts, which have sometimes admitted evidence of
prior reports, have been charged by the Courts of this country with
a departure from the universal principle, that wherever the character of a party is assailed the evidence must be confined to general
character.
This charge, however, is founded upon a misapprehension of the
object for which the proof was received; which was,- in most
instances, merely to show that the defendant had some reason to
believe the charge to be true, and thus repel to a greater or less
extent the inference of malice.
But there may be good reasons why this species of evidence
should not be received, even for the latter purpose. It must be
regarded as settled in this State, that it cannot be, although the
Courts have neglected to consider the distinction adverted to,
between the preof as bearing upon the character of the plaintiff, on
the one hand, and upon the malice of the defendant on the other.
(Napes vs. Weeks, 4 Wend., 659; Inman vs. Foster, 8 Wend.
602.)
The rule is the same in Massachusetts. (Wolcott vs. Hall, 5
Mass., 514.)
Again, there is another distinction which has been frequently
overlooked. To make a charge because others have made it,
depending upon them for its truth, and referring to them as
authority, is one thing; and simply to assert that others, naming
them, have made such a charge, is another and quite different
thing. In the latter case, I do not hesitate to say, that proof that
the persons named have made the charge, is admissible in mitigation, even if it be not prima facie a defence.
But the question with which we have more immediately to do is,
how far a publisher of a newspaper may be permitted to show, by
way of disproving malice and mitigating damages, that the libellous
matter was not original, but was either a literal or virtual republication of a charge previously published.
This subject is now stripped, by the section of the code to which
I have referred, of the technical difficulty which embarrassed the
Court in the cases of Cooper vs. Barker, 26 Wend., 105, and
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Cooper vs. Weed and others. See Wend. Introduction to Starkie
on Slander, p. 38.
The question can now, therefore, be considered upon its intrinsic
merits. It seems, then, to me, palpably absurd to hold that there
is no difference between the case of one who, under the promptings
of his own malignancy, coins and gives currency to a false and
libellous charge, and one who merely reiterates what he finds
already published to the world, as true.
There is, I think, no doubt, that where the publisher gives the
charge as a republication,and uses no language of his own which
in any way asserts its verity, he may plead and show in mitigation
that it was in truth a republication. But where the second publisher assumes to assert the charge himself, and merely refers to the
previous publication as his authority, a different question arises,
upon which I will not now express an opinion.
There is still another question, and that is, whether, in order to
admit the proof where it is admissible at all, the reference to the
previous publication must not be definite and certain, so as to point
out precisely where it is to be found.
These are grave inquiries, most of which will be found to a
greater or less extent involved in this case when it comes to be
tried.
The rule. in regard to striking out redundant matter is, that
unless it is clear that the facts and circumstances alleged cannotproperly be received in evidence, it will be retained until the trial.
I am not prepared to say that it is entrrely clear, that the matter
objected to here may not, under some possible state of the proof
upon the trial, be admissible in mitigation of the damages, and
must therefore refuse the motion to strike out the paragraph where
it occurs secondly in the answer.
Motion refused.
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u.reme Court of georgia.'
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KENDALL, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, vs. MATTHEW ORR, ET A,.,
DEFENDANTS IN ERROR.

1. The 5th section of the Act of 1809, (Prince 117,) and the 3d section of the Act of
1823, (Prince 183,) declared to be unconstitutional and void, on the ground that
they contain matter different from what is expressed in the titles of the Acts,
to which they respectively belong.

Debt, on Sheriff's bond, in Pike Superior Court.

Tried before

Judge STARK.

0. C. GIBSON, for Plaintiff in Error.
H. & G. J. GREENE, for the Defendants in Error.
The Opinion of the Court was delivered by
LumPKIN, J.-This is an action of debt, brought by the Governor, etc., for the use of George Prothro and Elisha Kendall,
against Matthew Orr, the late Sheriff of Pike County, and his securities on his bond, for an alleged default, in failing to pay over
money collected for the plaintiffs, on a ft. fa. at their instance,
against one Joseph B. Askew.
To this action, the defendants pleaded, among other things, that
the instrument sued on was not a statutory, but a Common Law
bond, because the same was not made and delivered within thirty
days from the time of the election of Orr to the 'office of Sheriff, as
as required by the statute; and that one recovery having been had
thereon already, in behalf of- the then Governor, for the use of one
Reuben Brown, there could be no other suit established on said
bond, for the recovery of the whole, or any portion of the penalty
thereof. The plaintiff moved to strike out the plea of former
recovery, upon the ground that the instrument sued on, was a statutory and not a voluntary bond; and that the plea did not show
that the whole penalty of the bond had been exhausted, which was
$20,000, but that a recovery in favor of Brown, was had in the,
sum of $964.47 principal, and $385.85 interest, and the sum of
1 From 12 Geo. Rep. 36, with the sheets of which we have been favored.
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S26.25 cost only, it being 'the amount of damages which he had
sustained in the premises.
The Judge of the Circuit Court, acting upon the adjudication of
this Court, as it was his duty to do, overruled the demurrer to the
defendant's plea, and this is the only alleged error in the bill- of
exceptions, which we find it necessary to consider.
[1.] The Act of 1809, requires the Sheriff to make application
for his commission to the Executive, within twenty days after being
elected to the office. (_Prince, 177.) The Act of 1811, bound the
Sheriff, in ten days after being notified of the arrival of his commission, to take the oath of office, and give the security required by
law. (.Tid, 178.) And the Act of 1823, declared the office vacant,
provided the officer elected failed to apply for and obtain his commission, and qualify within the time prescribed by the Acts of
1809 and 1811. .Bid,183.
Now the construction heretofore put upon these several statutes
by this Court was, that more than thirty days must not intervene
between the election of the Sheriff and the date of his bond. In
this case the election took place on the third day of January, 1842,
and the bond was given on the 11th of February next ensuing.
Consequently the presiding Judge pronounced the bond not good
as a statutory bond. And if there was error in this judgment, the
fault is ours, not Ms.
It is again argued, however, and we must say with great force,
that more than thirty days might necessarily elapse between the
time of the election and the execution of the bond, and that still its
validity as a statutory bond would not be destroyed. The Sheriff
might, from circumstances beyond his control, be unable to apply
for his commission, until the last day of the twenty allowed him for
that purpose. Owing to the press of business in the Executive
department, he might not be able to procure immediately from the
Governor, the dedimus potestatem. Indeed, the commission might
in many cases, nQt reach its place of destination, until more than
ten days had expired from the time of the application ; and it would
seem that this delay should not invalidate the bond.
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Taking the whole of these Acts together, the true construction
would seem to be, that the officer must apply for his commission
within twenty days; and that he must qualify and give security
within ten days from the time he is notified of the arrival of his
commission; and that failing to perform either of these requirements, his office is vacated; but that the time which may intervene
between the application of the Sheriff for his commission and of
his being notified of its arrival, is not fixed by law; and may or
may not postpone the final qualification of the officer, beyond thirty
days; and that he is not responsible for the delay.
But then, on the other hand, it was obvioisly the true intent of
the Legislature, to prescribe a limited period for the qualification of
the new officer, and that that period is thirty days; and that it is
not hard to hold, that while twenty days are allowed to the Sheriff
elect, within which to apply for his commission; he must, nevertheless, upon the peril of forfeiture, apply early enough to insure his
qualification within the thirty days designated.
Leaving this point, therefore, where it 'stands by our previous
adjudications, we are compelled, however reluctantly, to decide
upon this question, in the new aspect in which it is presented, for
the first time by counsel, namely: the constitutionality of those
provisionsin the Acts of 1809 and 1823, which make it obligatory
upon the Sheriff to apply for his commissio4 within twenty days
after his elebtion, upon pain of losing his office. We say we approach this subject with reluctance, not only because the duty itself
is one at all times of great delicacy, but we cannot shlut our eyes to
the fact, that owingto the haste of mach of our legislation, many
of our statutes will be found, we fear, upon close scrutiny, to be
obnoxious to the same objection.
But when the question is, whether we shall maintain a Statute or
the Constitution, which is the paramount law, and which we are
constrained by our oath of office to support and defend, we cannot
hesitate. We must maintain consciences void of offence, whatever
we do or omit to do. I am aware of the importance of adhering to
decisions, once solemnly made. It has been truly said, that a
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greater evil can scarcely attend a Court, than that the decisions of
such a tribunal should be unstable and fluctuating. There is, however, a greater evil than this, and that is to forfeit one's self-respect,
by committing deliberate perjury in the sight of high heaven.
We propose then, briefly to examine the Acts of 1809 and 1823,
for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not, they contain any
matter d/jferent from what is expressed in their respective titles.
For if they do, the same is at least pro tanto void.
The Act of 1809, purports to be "An Act to authorize the
Clerks of the Courts of Ordinary, Sheriffs, Coroners and Surveyors,
to hold their office during the intervention between the election
and commissioning of their successors, and to regulate the transfer
of papers and money. -Prince177. The preamble recites, that
"whereas, considerable evils may result from the suspension of
duties incumbent upon the Clerks of the Superior and Inferior
Courts, Clerks of the Courts of *Ordinary, Sheriffs, Coroners, and
County Surveyors, for remedy whereof, be it enacted.
"1Sec. 1. That the aforesaid officers shall perform all the duties
of their respective offices, during the time intervening between the
election and commissioning of"their successors, with all the responsibilities to which they are liable, previous to the said election."
Here then, is the clause intended to provide a remedy for the
evil complained of, and it isfull and complete for that purpose.
Subsequent enactments provide for the transfer of papers and
money, the other and secondary object designated in the title to
the Act of 1809. Then follows the 5th section, making it the duty
of the officers elected, to make application to the Executive, within
tventy days, for their respective commissions, after their having
been elected to either of said offices.
What has this do with that portion of the title, which authorizes
the old Sheriff to hold his office until his successor is qualified, or
which regulates the transfer of papers and money, from one to the
other? Absolutely nothing. Had the title been general-as for
instance, an Act "inrelation to the public officers, or for the particular objects designated, and for other purposes-the construction
would have been different. But here the title is definite, and therefore
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necessarily limited. And to permit other and- totally different matter
to be incorporated, would be to let in the very mischief intended to
be prevented: and thus render the Constitution of no effect.
The objection to the Act of 1823, is more plain and palpable
still. Its title is "An Act to carry into effect the sixth section of
the fourth article of the Constitution, (Prince,183,) which is in
these words: No person who heretofore hath been, or hereafter
may be a collector or holder of public moneys, shall be eligible to
any office in this State, until such person shall have accounted for
and paid into the treasury, all sums for which he may be accountable or liable." Prince, 912. And the firs-section of the Act of
1823, declares in substance, that no holders of public moneys shall
be commissioned to any office, while in default. Section second,
requires the person elect, in addition to the oath of office, to swear
that he is not the holder of any public moneys unaccounted for.
Thus far, the Act was in strict conformity with its title. But
then follows the third section, declaring that all officers who shall
fail to apply for and obtain their commissions and certificates, and
qualify-within the time and the manner heretofore pointed out by
law, viz : by the Acts of 1809 and 1811, shall not only forfeit their
offices, but be ineligible to the vacancy.
Can any thing be more foreign frobm the title of this Act, than
the matter contained in this section? We cannot do otherwise than
pronounce the fourth section of the Act of 1809, and the third section of the Act of 1823, unconstitutional and void. And that no
time being fixed for applying for commissions, and no penalty
attached for failure 'to do so, that bond in this case, is good as a
statutory bond, it having been given within a reasonable time after
the election, and having all the other formalities required by law.
It has been suggested, that the prohibition in the seventeenth
section of the first article of the Constitution, "nor shall any law
or ordinance pass, containing any matter different from what is expressed in the titles thereof," is directory only to the Legislative
and Executive or law-making departments of the government. But
we do not so understand it; on the contrary, we consider it as
much a matter of judicial cognizance, as any other provision in
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that instrument. If the Courts would refuse to execute a law suspending the writ of habeas corpus, when the public safety did not
require it; a law violatory of the freedom of the press, or trial by
jury, neither would they enforce a statute which cohtained matter
different from what was expressed in the title thereof.
We are familiar with the history of this clause in the Constitution, and the striking event which gave rise 'to it. The necessity
for its observance increases with each successive session of the
Legislature.
For the truth of this remark, I need only appeal to the evidences
of haste and inadventence spread broad-cast on our Statute Book.
It is a common practice to pass bills by their title only, without
requiring them to be read, in their progress through each branch
of the General Assembly. To prevent fraud and surprise, how important it is, that the members should be notified at least, by the
title of the Act, of the subject-matter about which they are legislating; at any rate, that they should not be misled by the title.
It is unnecessary to examine any other point made by the record,
as the plaintiffs will be entitled to a recovery, provided they can
make out their case in other respects.

e
Supreme Court of Ohio, January Term, 1853.
LAWSON AND COVODE V8. THE FARMERS BANK O

SALEM.

1. Under the Statite of Ohio, of March, 1850, which provides that "no person
offered as a witness shall be excluded by reason of his or her interest in the
event of the action; but this section shall not apply to a party to the action,
nor to any party for whose immediate benefit such action is prosecuted or de-

fended, &c."

Directors and Stockholders of a Bank are tompetent witnesses

for the Corporation, in a suit to which it is a party.

2. Notice of dishonour of a bill or note, where the parties reside in different places
or States, must be deposited in the post office in time for the mail of the next
day, provided it be not made up and closed at an unreasonably early hour, or

before early and convenient business hours. Downs vs. _PlantersBank, 1 Sm.
& M., 261; Chick vs. Pillsbury, 24 Maine, 458, approved; dicta of Chancellor
Kent; 3 Comm. 100; and of Judge Story, Comment. on Bills, 291, overruled.
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3. Where the mail from the place-of protest of a bill, to the plabe of residence of
the endorser, closed at ten minutes past nine, A. M., on the day subsequent to
the protest; business hours beginning at seven o'clock, A. .. , at the former
place, it was held that notice of dishonour deposited in the post office after
such closing of the mail, was too late.
4. The holder of a bill is only bound to give notice of dishonour to his immediate
endorser; and so of an agent for collection.

This was a writ of error directed to the Court of Common Pleas
of Columbiana County.
Georqe A. Lee, for Plaintiffs in Error.
Upham & Brooki, "forDefendant in Error.
The opinion of thie Court was delivered by
BARTLEY, OH. J.-The original action was assumpsit for reco-'
very against Lawson and Covode, as endorsers of a Bill of Exchange,
which is as follows:
Tell8ville, April 25, 1848.
84000.'00.
Ninety days after date, pay to the order of Lawson and Covode,
four thousand dollars, value received, and place the same to the
account of
Yours, &c.
W. F. JORDAN.
To J. JORDAN & SON, Pittsburg."
t' Pay to Farmers Bank of Salem.
LAWSON & COVODE."
Accepted by 5. Jordan & Son.
The declaration counts upon the instrument above mentioned,
and also contains the common counts. Plea-Non Assumpsit.
It appears that this Bill of Exchange which was drawn and endorsed in this State, was discounted by the Bank of Salem, and the
money paid to the acceptors thereof; subsequently it was endorsed
by the Bank of Salem to the Exchange Bank of Fittsburg, in the
State of Pennsylvania, for collection, Jordan & Son, the acceptors,
living in the City of' Pittsburg. It matured in the hands of the
Exchange Bank of Pittsburg, on the 27th day of July, 1848, and
being dishonored by the acceptors in Pittsburg, in the State of
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Pennsylvania, was protested for non-payment by Webb Closey, a
Notary Public of that city.
On the trial of the cause in the Court of Common Pleas, the
Bank gave in evidence the Bill of Exchange, and the notarial protest attached thereto, dated July 27, 1848, also&a certified copy of
the Notarial Record of Webb Closey, with proof of his death since
the protest of the bill. The defendants below objected to this last
testimony, but the Court admitted it. During the trial the Bank
called Joseph J. Brooks and John Dellenbough, as witnesses, both
being Stockholders and Directors in the Salem Bank, not only at
that time, but also when the bill was discounted and matured. To
the testimony of these two witnesses the defendants below objected,
but the Court overruled the objection, and admitted their testimony,
which was material.
The bank having rested, the defendants in the Court below.gave
in evidence the notice of protest, which appears in the record sent
to the Salem Bank by Notary Closey, and produced by the Cashier
of the Salem Bank. And evidence having been given that the
Exchange Bank of Pittsburg closed at three o'clock, P. M., on the
27th of July, 1848; that Notary Closey's office was about one
square from the Pittsburg Post Office, that the mail left Pittsburg
for Salem, at ten o'clock, A. M., on the 28th of July, and was
closed at ten minutes after nine o'clock, A. M., and that the business hours of Pittsburg were from seven o'clock, A. M. till dusk,
the parties rested the case. The notarial protest does not state
when the notices were deposited in the post office, but the notice to
the Salem Bank, which enveloped the notice to Lawson & Covode,
the accommodation endorsers, is mail marked at the Pittsburg Post
Office, July 29, 1848.'
*
*
*
*
Judgment was rendered against the defendants in the Court of
Common Pleas, at the September Term, 1850, for the sum of
4,513.33. And it is to reverse this judgment that this writ of
error is brought..
I The charge of the Court is omittc&. here from want of space. It was to the
effect that the Notziry hail thu wholc of the 28th in which to depaotit the notice.ED. L. REG.
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Several questions are presented by the assignment of errors, but
it will be sufficient to notice the following:
1. Were Brooks and Dellenbough competent witnesses on behalf
of the plaintiff, on the trial in the Court below ?
2. Did the Court err in the charge to the jury, as to the sufficiency 6f the notice of the dishonor of the bill.
The first question involves the construction to be given to the
third sectibn of the statute of March, 1850, to improve the law of
evidence, which provides, that "1no person offered as a witness shall
be exclded by reason of his or her interest in the event of the
action, but this section shall not apply to a party to the action, nor
to any party for whose immediate benefit such action is ,prosecuted
or defended," &c.
This statute being remedial in its nature, is entitled to a liberal
construction. The tendency of legislation has of late been to throw
wide open the door for the admission of testimony, and in the administration of justice to repose rather upon objections to the
credibility than to the competency of witnesses.
A stockholder in a private corporation is interested in the event
of any suit to which it is a party. His interest is not immediate
or direct, yet it is that legal interest which would render him incompetent as a witness on behalf of the corporation without the
prov.- ns of the statute above mentioned. The interest of a stockholder is not increased by his becoming a director. The directors
of a corporation' are simply agents in directing the management of
its business, and this agency does not render their personal interest
any more immediate or direct than that of other stockholders, when
not coup'ed with a special individual liability of the directors for
the debts of the corporation. So far, therefore, as the testimony
of these witnesses was objectionable on the ground of interest, the
o.jection went to their credibility, and not to their competency.
Were these witnesses then incompetent on the ground of being
eithiv parties to. the action, or parties for whose immediate benefit
the action was prosecuted? A party to the action is a person
whose name appears upon the record in the case either as party,
plaintiff, or defendant. They were not, therefore, actual parties to
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the action; but were they parties for whose immediate benefit the
action was prosecuted? The statutory exception of "any party
for whose immediate benefit such action is prosecuted or defended,"
has an evident reference to that class of cases where the real party
not named upon the record, prosecutes or defends through he
medium of a mere nominal party in the action. The requisite
qualification to bring a person within the exception is, that he be
not simply interestod in the event of the suit, but the object of
immediate consideration in the suit, or real beneficiary for whom
the suit is prosecuted or defended. To constitute this, the interest
of such person in the suit must be direct and inevitable, and not
contingent, indirect or remote. A stockholder and the corporation
of which he is a member, are separate and distinct persons in law,
and their interests are always distinct, and sometimes adverse. A
person may either sue or be sued by a corporation of which he is a
member. A judgment against the Bank of Salem would reach the
property of the corporation, but could not bind the separate property of the stockholder in his individual capacity; and a judgment
in favor of the bank, would not enure to the immediate benefit of
any of the stockholders, but their interest in such judgment would
be indirect, and depend on contingencies.
The immediate benefit contemplated by the statute to create the
incompetency, is an interest or advantage resulting tW him personally, as the immediate and necessary consequence of the judgment
itself, and not such as might reach him indirectly throtrgh the
medium of another person, and dependant upon a contingency.
The statute of Ohio above referred to, is very similar to Lord
Denman's Act 6 & 7 Viet. c. 85, so far as it relates to the interest
of witnesses, and the incompetency of parties. And the language
of the exception in the English act is: "for whose immediate and
individual benefit," instead of "for whose immediate bentfit," the
suit is prosecuted or defended. Numerous decisions have been
made in England, -giving a construction to this act, similar to that
which is here given to the Ohio Statute. In the case of Black vs.
Jones, 3 English Law and Equity, R. 559, it was decided that a
creditor for whose benefit an assignment had been made to a trus-
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tee by the debtor, is a competent witness for the trustee in an action brought by him against an execution creditor of the debtor,
who had levied upon the goods, when the very question was as to
the validity of the deed. Also, in the case of Harding vs. Hodgkinson, 4 English Law and Equity, R. 462, that a -person entitled
t6 a share in the proceeds of land devised to another, in trust for
sale, is a competent witness in an action brought by the latter to
establish his right to land for the purpose aforesaid.
The Court of Exchequer in England is reported as saying, that
"the test whether a witness is a person in whose immediate and
individual behalf, an action is brought or defended, either wholly
or in part, is, whether his declarations would be admissible against
the party on whose behalf he is called to give evidence."
We are of opinion, therefore, that the Court did not err, in their
ruling on the subject of the admissibility of the testimony in question.
Did the Court of Common Pleas err in charging the jury, that
if the notice to the endorsers, of the demand and non-payment of
the bill, was deposited in the Post Office at Pittsburg, at any time
during the day after the day of dishonor, without regard to the
time of the departure of the mail for that day, it would be sufficient notice; and moreover, that if it was found inconvenient to
deposit the notice in the Post Office in time for the mail of that
day, it was in proper time if the notice was deposited in time to be
sent off 'by the next mail of the day next after the day following
the day of the dishonor of the bill?
This involves a very important question of the Law Merchant,
and it is not a little surprising that there should remain any doubt
or uncertainty at this late day, upon a question of such vital importance to the interests of commercial countries respecting the
duties and liabilities of holders and parties to dishonored paper.
And it is a matter of no small moment, that a question, which
enters so largely as does this, into the every day business transactions of different commercial states and countries, should be settled,
not only upon a certain and unvarying, but also upon a uniform
basis.
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The liability of the endorser is strictly conditional-dependant
both upon due demand of payment upon the maker or acceptor,
and also due and legal notice of the non-payment. The purpose
and object of such demand and notice, is to enable the endorser to
look to his own interest, and take immediate measures for his indemnity. The demand and notice being conditions precedent to
the endorser's liability, it is incumbent on the holder to make clear
and satisfactory proof of them before he can recover. The. plaintiffs inerror in this case, being accommodation endorsors, may well
insist upon strict proof of due diligence in giving notice of the
dishonor of the bill.
The law does not require the utmost diligence in the holder, in
giving notice of the dishonor of a bill or note. All that is requisite,
is ordinary or reasonable diligence. And this is not only the rule
and requirement of the law merchant, but a statutory provision of
this State. But what amounts to due diligence, or reasonable notice is, when the facts are ascertained, purely.a question of law,
settled "with a view to practical convenience, and the usual course
of business."
The question was at one time strenuously contested, whether due
diligence did not require, that where the parties reside in the same
place, the notice of non-payment would be insufficient, unless given
on the day of the dishonor of the bill; and where the parties
reside in different places, unless sent by the mail of that day, or
first possible or practicable, mail after the default. _Findal vs.
Brown, 1 Term. R. 167. Darbislirevs. Parker,6 East 3r Marius
on Bills, 24. But the rule was established, and is supported by
great weight of authority, that where parties reside in different
places, and the post is the mode of conveyance adopted, although
it was in no case necessary to send the notice by the post of the
same day of the dishonori or of the knowledge of the dishonor, the
holder or other party being entitled to the whole of that day after
the dishonor, or kiowledge of the dishonor, to prepare his notice,
yet that the notice would be insufficient unless put into the Post
Office in time to go by the next mail after that day. And this is
in conformity with the rule laid down by Mr. Chitty, in his learned
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treatise- on Bills of Exchange, in the following explicit language:
" When the parties do not reside in the same place, and the notice
is to be sent by the general post, then the holder or party to give
the notice, must take care to forward notice by the post of the
next day after the dishonor, or after he receives notice of such dishonor, whether that post sets off from the place where he is early
or. late; and if there be no post on such next day, then he must
send off notice by the very next post that occurs after that day."
Chitty on Bills, 485, (late edition.)
Thi is in accordance with the rule as settled by the Supreme
Court of the United States. In Lenox vs. Roberts, 2 Wheaton,
373, Chief Justice Marshall says: "It is the opinion of the Court
that notice of the default of the maker should be put into the Post
Office early enough to be sent by the mail of the day succeeding
the'last day of grace." -And in the case of the Bank of Alexandria
vs. Swan, 9 Peters, 33, Justice Thompson approved of the general
rule laid down in the case of Lenox vs. Boberts, holding that notice
of the dishonor need not be forwarded on the last day of grace, but
should be sent by the mail of the next day after the dishonor. The
same xule was adopted by Justice Washington, in the case of The
United States vs.. Parker's Adm'rs, 4 Wash. R. 465, in which

case that decision was affirmed on error by the Supreme Court, 12
Wheat. 559. The same rule received the sanction of Mr. Justice
Story, in the case of the Seventh Ward Bank vs. Hanrick, 2

Story's R. 416. Although in the case of Mitchell vs. Degrand,
1 Masonl180, he appears to have been disposed to even greater
strictness, holding that when a bill is once dishondred, the holder
is bound to give notice by the next practicable mail, to the parties
whom he means to charge for the default. This, however, is explained by Justice Wishington, in the case of U. S. vs. Parker's
Adm'rs, to mean that the notice should be put into the office in.
time to be sent by the mail of the succeeding day. This rule,
adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States, which is
supported by the great weight of authority in England, and in the
'several States of the Union, in which the question appears to have
been settled by reported adjudications, is subject to some qualifi-
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cation relaxing its rigour. If two mails leave the same day on the
route to the place of the residence of the endorser, it is sufficient
to deposit the notice in the Post Office in time to go by either
mail of that day, inasmuch as the fractions of the day are not
counted. Wliitewell vs. John8on,17 Mass. R..449, 454. Howard
vs. Ies, 1 Hill, N. Y. R. 263.
And for the reason that the mail of the day succeeding the day
of the default, may go out in some places soon after midnight, or
at a very early hour in the morning, and is sometimes made up and
closed the evening preceding, it has been adjudged that inasmuch
as the holder is allowed till the day after the day of the default to
send off the notice, reasonable diligence would not require him to
deposit the notice in the Post Office at an unseasonably early hour,
or before a reasonable time can be had for depositing the notice in
the Post Office after early business hours of that day. The rule as
qualified and settled by the late authorities, and which I take to be
the correct one, is, that where the parties reside in the same place
or city, the notice may be given on the day of the default, but if
given at any time before the expiration of the day thereafter, it
will be sufficient; and when the parties reside in different places or
States, the notice may be sent by the mail of the day of the default,
but if not, it must be deposited in the office in time for the mail of
the next day, provided, the mail of that day be not made up and
closed at an unseasonably early hour. If, however, the mail of
that day be closed before a convenient or reasonable time after
early business hours, or if there be no mail sent out on that day,
then it must be deposited in time for the next possible post. In the
case of Downs vs. Planters'Bank, 1 Smedes & Marshall's R. 261,
and also the case of Chicd vs. Pillsbury, 24 Maine R. 458, the
doctrine on this subject has been more fully examined than perhaps
in any of the older cases, and the rule adopted is, that the notice,
in order to charge the endorser living in another place or State,
must be deposited ih the Post Office in time to be sent by the mail
of the day succeeding the day of the dishonor, providing, the mail
of that diy be not closed at an unseasonably early hour, or before
early and convenient business hours. And this, I take to be the
40
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correct rule. Fullerton et al vs. The Bank of the U. S., 1 Peters,
605, 618; Bagle Bank vs. Chapin, 3 Pick. 180, 188; Talbot vs.
Clark, 8 Pick. 51; Carter vs. Burly, 9 New Hamp. 559, 570;
Farmers' Bank of Maryland vs. Duvall, 7 Gill & Johnson, 79;
Freeman's Bank vs. Perkins, 18 Maine R. 292; Mead vs. .Engs,
5 Cowen, 803; Sewall vs. Russell, 3 Wend. 276; Brown vs.
Ferguson, 4 Leigh, 87; Dodge vs. Bank of Kentucky, 2 Marshall,
610; Rtickman vs. Bian, 5 Littell, 24; HartfordBank vs. Steedman, 3 Connecticut R. 489; Brenzor vs. Wiglhtman, 7 Watts & Serg.
264; Townsly vs. Springer,1 Louisiana, 122; Bank of Natchez vs.
King, 2 Robinson, 243; Brown vs. Turner, 1 Alabama 1. 752;
Lockwood vs. Crawford, 18 Conn. 363; Bayley on Bills, 262;
Story on Promissory Notes, sec. 325; and Byles on Bills of Exchange, 160.
Some obscurity and uncertainty have been created on this subject,
by the expression used in some of the cases, and by some of the
elementary writers, that the holder or person giving the notice, has
"one day," or "an entire day," in which to give the notice after
the day of dishonor. The term one day or an entire day, seems
not to have been used always in the same sense; and the confusion
appears to have in part arisen from the fact, that where the parties
reside in the same place, notice at any time before the expiration of
the day after the day of the default will be sufficient, while 'where
the parties reside in different places, the notice must frequently be
mailed early in the day to be in time for the mail of that day.
The defendant in error relies upon the doctrine laid down in the
elementary works of Chancellor Kent and Mr. Justice Story, as
fully sustaining the charge of the Court below. Inasmuch as precision alid certainty in the. settlement of this rule are of very great
importance, a careful examination of the subject seems to be
required.
Chancellor Kent, whose accuracy in his Commentaries on American Law, is never to be questioned without grave consideration, in
the late editions of his works, (See Kent's Com. p. 106,) states the
rule as follows:

"According to the modern doctrine, the notice must be given by
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the first direct and regular conveyance. This means the first mail
that goes after the day next to the third day of grace; so that if
the third day of grace be on Thuriday, and the drawer or endorser
reside out of town, the notice may indeed be sent on Thursday, but
must be put in the Post Office or mailed on Friday, so as to be
forwarded as soon as possible thereafter." And in a note by the
learned author, explanatory of the text, it is said that " the prin--ceiple that ordinary reasonable diligence is sufficient, and that the
law does not regard the fractions of the day in sending notice, will
sustain the rule as it is now generally and best understood in England, and the commercial part of the United States, that notice put
into the Post Office on the next day, at any time of the day, so as
to be reaay for the first mail that goes thereafter, is due notice,
though it may not be mailed in season to go by the mail of the day
next after the day of the default."
Several cases are cited by the learned author, but they do not
sustain his position. The case of tTackson vs. Ricards, 2 Cains
Cases, 343, referred to, is not in point, ffayne8 vs. Bir s, 3 Bos.
and Pub. 601, decides that when notes fell due on Saturday, the
notice sent by the post on Monday was sufficient. Sunday being
excluded, and not taken into account, the notice was sent by the
post of the next legal day. In the cases of Bray vs. Hadwen, 5
Maule & Selwyn, 68, and Wright vs. Shawcress, 2 Barnwell & Aldersons, 501, it was decided that the notice having arrived on Sunday, was to be considered as having been received on Monday, and
then the party had till Tuesday, the next post day, for giving the
notice. In Gall vs. erenry, 1 Moody & Malkin, 61, where no
mail when out on the day next after the day of the default, it was.
held that the rule being an impossible one on that day, a notice
sent by the next succeeding mail day would be in season. The
vs. Thruhs, 8 B. & C. 887, turned upon the question
case of 'Firth
whether the attorney employed to ascertain the residence of the
defendant, should be allowed a day to consult his client after information of the defendant's residence. And Lord Tenterden said:
"if the letter, (giving information of the defendant's residence,).
hail been sent to the principal, he would have been bound to give.
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notice on the next day." The only other case referred to, is that
of ffawkes vs. Salter, 4 Bing., 715; and this is the only dne which
even tends to sustain the position of the learned author. In that
case, the bill was dishonored on Saturday, and the mail left at half
past nine o'clock on Monday morning; and an unsuccessful attempt
was made to prove that the notice was put into the Post Office
on Tuesday morning. Best, C. J., expressed himself clearly of
opinion "that it would have been sufficient, if the letter had been
put into the Post Office before the mail started on Tuesday morning, but that there was no sufficient' evidence that it had been put
in, even on Tuesday morning." The opinion in this case was,
therefore, a mere dictum, which determined nothing, the case being
decided upon different ground.
But the position of Chancellor Kent, above referred to, is in
direct conflict with the rule as laid down by himself in the first
edition of his work. In the edition of 1828, vol. 3, p. 73, Kent's
Com., the rule is stated in these words: "According to the modern
doctrine, the notice must be given by the first direct regular conveyance. This means the first convenient and practicable mail that
goes on the day next to the third day of grace; so that if the third
day of grace be on Thursday, and the drawer or endorser reside
out of town, the notice may indeed be sent on Thursday, but must
be sent by the mail that goes on Friday."
In the last edition of this work, published in 1851, the editor,
William Kent, admits the weight of authority to be in favor of the
rule as laid down in Chick vs. Pillsbury, 24 Maine, and -Downsvs.
PlantersBank, 1 Snedes & Marshall, above referred to; and he
says: that "the opinion of Ch. J. Best, in 4 Bing. 715, is the
oaly one that sustains the rule suggested, and that the observations
(f Mr. Justice Story, were too latitudinarian in allowing the entire
whole day next after the dishonor."
It is true, that Mr. Justice Story, in his work on Bills of Exchange, Sect. 291, says: "that an endorser need not give notice to
his antecedent endorser, till twenty-four hours have elapsed after
the receipt of his own notice of the dishonor."
And in his note to Sect. 290, of the same work, the author says:
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that "the rule does not appear to be so strict 'as it is laid down by
Mr. Chitty, and that it would be more correct to say, that the
holder is entitled to one whole day to prepare his notice, and that,
therefore, it will be sufficient, if he sends it by the next post that
goes after twenty-four hours from the time of the dishonor," &c.
And he adds: "I have seen no late cases which import a different
doctrine. On the contrary, they appear to me to sustain it; but
as I do not know of any direct authority which positively so decides.
This remark is merely propounded for the consideration of the
learned reader."
It is not necessary here to inquire whether the position taken by
the learned author, is in conflict with the decisions made by himself in 1 Mason's R. 180, and 2 Story's R. 416, above referred to.
In his same work on Bills of Exchange, he has stated the rule with
great precision and accuracy in the following language, in Sect.
382: "In all cases where notice is required to be given, it is sufficient, if the notice is personal, that it is given on the day succeeding the day of the dishonor, early enough for the party to receive
it on that day. If sent by the mail, it is sufficient if it is sent by
the mail of the next day, or the next practicable mail." And in
Sect. 288: "If the post or mail leaves the next day after the dishonor, the notice should be sent by that post or mail, if the time of
its closing or departure is not at too early an hour to disable'the
holder from a reasonable performance of the duty. So that the
rule may be fairly stated in more general terms to be, that the
notice is in all cases to be sent by the next practicable post or mail
after the day of the dishonor, having a due reference to all the
circumstances of the case." The same learned author has laid
down the rule very fully to the same effect, in his work on Promiasory Notes. (See Story on Promissory Notes, Sect. 324.)
The statement of the rule by the learned Commentator, in the
last extract, is consistent with the doctrine established by the
Supreme Court of the United States, and fully sustained by authority.
The discrepancies which have arisen on this subject, appear to
have grown out of an inaccurate use in some of the books and do-.
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cisions of the terms "his day," "1an entire day," and a "Iwhole
day," &c. These phrases being at one time understood or taken
literally, and at another time to mean a space of time equal to a
full day. If these phrases are to be taken to mean the duration of
a full day instead of the day itself, in their general application, the
effect would be to change and break down numerous well settled
and useful rules.
The law, as a general thing, does not have
regard to the fractions of a day, and thus compel parties to resort
to nice questions of the sufficiency of a certain number of hours, or
minutes, and to the taking of the parts of two different days to
make up what may be considered in one sense a day, because equal
inoduration to one entire day. If this were the case, the endorser,
after having been notified, would often be unable to determine
whether he had been-notified in season or not, until he had learned
the hour of the day when the default occurred: and the holder would
have it in his power at times, of affecting injuriously, the right of
the endorser to an early notice, by delaying the presentment until
a late hour in the day. Nothing more could have been intended
by the use of these phrases than that each party should have a
specified day upon which the act enjoined upon him, should be performed. This is the sense in which Lord Ellenborough used it in
the case of Smith vs. Mulett, 2 Camp. 208, when he said, "'ifa
party'has an entire day, ]e must send off his letter conveying the
notice, within post time of that day." And it is said by a learned
elementary author, "if a party has an entire day, he must send off
his letter conveying the notice of the dishonor of the Bill within
post time of that day. -Byles on Bills, 161.
The rule laid down in Smith's Compendium of Mercantile Law,
to which the defendant in error has referred, will not, as I apprehend, be found on close examination, to be at variance with the
doctrine adopted in this case. Smith's Mercantile Law, 810.
It is claimed on behalf of the plaintiff in error, that the notice
of the dishonor of the Bill, should have been sent immediately to
them, instead of being sent as it was in the first place, to the Bank
of Salem. The holder is not bound to give notice of the dishonor
to any more than his immediate endorser. And each party to a

